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I. I.e. § 42-4002(c) 
"Geothermal resource" means the natural heat energy of the earth, the energy, in 
whatever form, which may be found in any position and at any depth below the surface of the 
earth present in, resulting from, or created by, or which may be extracted from such natural heat, 
and all minerals in solution or other products obtained from the material medium of any 
geothermal resource. Ground water having a temperature of two hundred twelve (212) degrees 
Fahrenheit or more in the bottom of a well shall be classified as a geothermal resource. 
Geothermal resources are found and hereby declared to be sui generis, being neither a mineral 
resource nor a water resource, but they are also found and hereby declared to be closely related 
to and possibly affecting and affected by water and mineral resources in many instances. 
Id. 
ARGUMENT 
II. DEED INTERPRETATION 
A. Plain Meaning 
Bedrock dismisses out of hand Idatherm's argument the 1946 Bell Deed did not include 
"geothermal resources" based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the language. 
Both sides have conceded there is no ambiguity in the 1946 Bell Deed. The question 
before the court is a question of law. As such, it is not appropriate to look to the intent of the 
parties outside of the 1946 Bell Deed. "[I]ntent must be ascertained from the language of the 
deed as a matter of law without resort to extrinsic evidence." C&G Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 
766,25 P.3d 76,80 (2001). 
Yet, Bedrock is asking the Court to divine the intent of the parties to the 1946 Bell Deed 
by using "extrinsic" evidence. Bedrock also resorts to foreign cases to define the term mineral 
though such a definition is inconsistent with the Idaho Geothermal Resources Act which, 
ultimately, will determine whether or not the resource can be exploited. 
Idatherm believes the court can and should interpret the 1946 Bell Deed from the 
"instrument itself." The 1946 Bell Deed does not reserve "geothermal resources." A simple 
reading provides the solution. If the parties intended geothermal resources to be included with 
minerals why not state such? The 1946 Bell Deed reserved only oil, gas and minerals. 
Bedrock states such a position "begs the question of what 'mineral' means, without ever 
attempting to answer the question." Such a statement is not true. Idatherm offers an Idaho 
statute to define "mineral." Idatherm can show the intent under the 1946 Bell Deed was to 
reserve only minerals using both the Idaho statute and Bedrock's own authority to show that 
mineral is different from geothermal. 
B. Minerals are Different than Geothermal 
The cases cited by Bedrock support the position that minerals are not the same as 
"geothermal resources." 
In fact, the cases cited by Bedrock, all define geothermal resources as "analogous" with 
or "closely related" to oil, gas, and minerals. Thus, recognizing they are different substances. 
Geothermal resources are not minerals. 
"Analogous" is defined as follows: 
Derived from the Greek ana, up, and logos, ratio. Means bearing 
some resemblance or likeness that permits one to draw an 
analogy." 
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition (1990). 
In Geothermal Kinetics, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 75 Cal. App. 3d 56, 141 Cal. Rptr. 
879 (Ct. App. 1977), the court stated:"The production of the energy from geothermal energy is 
analogous to the production of energy from such minerals as coal, oil and natural gas .... " 
Id. at 8 81 (emphasis added). 
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In R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1076 (Utah 1997), the 
Utah Supreme Court quoted the Geothermal Kinetics case when stating, "energy from 
geothermal resources is analogous to the production of energy from such other mineral 
resources .... " (Emphasis added). 
In U.S. v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 1977) when comparing mineral, 
oil, gas and coal the Court notes that geothermal resources are "more closely related" to "such 
substances. " 
There is nothing in the 1946 Bell Deed that shows it was the intent to include geothermal 
within mineral. Geothermal is not defined as mineral under Idaho statute and is recognized as not 
being a mineral under the case law cited by Bedrock. Such a conclusion would require an 
extrinsic factual determination, and both sides agree the 1946 Bell Deed is not ambiguous. 
C. Severance ofthe Surface from the Subsurface is not Appropriate 
Because Geothermal is different than mineral, Bedrock argues vehemently for the Court 
to consider that a reservation of "mineral" severs the surface from the subsurface. Such a 
conclusion is not supported by conveyance language of the 1946 Bell Deed. It is also not 
supported by existing Idaho law. 
This court has declared "[t]o determine the intent of the parties, the contract or other 
writing must be viewed as a whole and in its entirety." Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dist. 
134 Idaho 731, 9 P .3d 534 (2000). It is for this reason that Stuki v. Parker, 108 Idaho 929, 703 
P.2d 693 (1985) is so important. The Stuki court was asked to interpret a reservation in a Deed 
which reserved to the Grantors "all the phosphate and phosphate rock in the lands above 
described .... " Id. at 694. In finding the reservation included more than just phosphate rock, the 
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Stuki court recognized the necessity of viewing all of the language in the deed in order to 
determine what was reserved. The conveyance language was deemed of critical importance. 
In Stuki, the grantor conveyed "All the surface rights in and to and upon the [] described 
tract ofland .... " Id. After viewing all of the language] of the deed the court held: 
Id. at 695. 
The correct interpretation of a deed which conveys the surface and 
then lists specific reservations is this: the reservations relate only to 
that which was first conveyed, the surface. Without a construction 
in this manner, the insertion of the word surface becomes 
meaningless and only the reservation is of any import. When the 
grantor conveys the surface he means just that-a conveyance of the 
surface, and to hold otherwise controverts the clear intention of the 
grantor. 
Thus, every word of the 1946 Bell Deed is of importance particularly the conveyance 
language. For example, if the 1946 Bell Deed had reserved "all minerals" but made no mention 
of "oil" would the plain ordinary reading of the 1946 Bell Deed allow Idatherm to lease and then 
exploit and develop the oil on the subject property in dispute? The simple answer would be yes, 
as oil is not a mineral. However, under Bedrock's interpretation, the "mineral" reservation severs 
the surface from the sub-surface. Thus, Ida-Therm's oil lease would not be valid despite the fact 
that "oil" was not reserved by the grantors. 
Such an interpretation renders the words oil and gas meaningless in the 1946 Bell Deed. 
Under Bedrock's theory the only word that is of any importance is the term "mineral." Again, 
"[t]o determine the intent of the parties, the contract or other writing must be viewed as a whole 
and in its entirety." Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 9 P.3d 534 (2000). 
J Deeds that convey mineral interests are subject to general rules governing contract interpretation including the rule 
that the deed will be construed against the grantor rather than against the grantee, because the grantor selects his or 
her own words. 53A Am, 1ur. 2d, Mines and Minerals, § 185 (2012). 
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The importance of the conveyance language was not lost on the Stuki Court. It 
recognized ignoring the conveyance language rendered it "meaningless." The conveyance 
language in the 1946 Bell Deed must be considered. To not do so would render it 
"meaningless. " 
The 1946 Bell Deed conveyed: 
"fA 7ll the following described real estate ... " [legal description 
omitted] "TOGETHER with .. . all estate, right, title and interest in 
and to said property as well as in law as in equity .... " TO HAVE 
AND TO HOLD, all and singular, the above mentioned and 
described premises together with the appurtenances, unto the party 
of the second part, and to his heirs and assigns .forever 2. And the 
said parties of the first part, and their heirs, the said premises in 
the quiet and peaceable possession of the said party of the second 
part, and his heirs and assigns against the said parties of the first 
part and their heirs and against all and every person and persons, 
whomsoever, lawfully claiming or to claim the same, and shall and 
will WARRANT and by these present forever DEFEND. 
R Vol. II, p. 229-230, Exhibit 1 (emphasis added). 
Nothing in the conveyance language establishes the intent to sever the surface from the 
subsurface. 
Bedrock tries to counter this position by arguing the word "surface" is used in the 1946 
Bell Deed. When it states: "the first parties hereby reserve to themselves, and to their heirs and 
assigns, all the oil, gas and minerals, in, on, or under, the surface of said lands .... " Id. What 
Bedrock fails to recognize is the use of the word "surface" is part of the reservation language 
and not the conveyance language. Bedrock's argument is the same as the grantees in Stuki and 
they make the exact same mistake. They only look at the reservation language and ignore the 
conveyance language. 
2 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Ethington Family Trust, l37 Idaho 435, 438, 50 P.3d 450, 453, (2002), "notable are the 
deeds' use of the term "forever," which is consistent with the conveyance of a fee simple .... " 
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The Grantor in the Stuki case only conveyed the surface. Nothing in the 1946 Bell Deed 
shows the intent to convey only the surface, or to sever the surface from the subsurface. 
In fact, Bedrock's own argument supports the position the surface was not to be severed 
from the subsurface by noting that the reservation in the 1946 Bell Deed specifically reserved the 
right to develop mineral rights, "in on or under the surface .... " See Respondents' Brief pg. 6 
lines 19-20. See also 1946 Bell Deed R, Vol. II, p. 229-230. 
If, it was the intent to sever the surface from subsurface, why did the 1946 Bell Deed 
reserve the right to remove "oil, gas and minerals" not just "under" the surface but also the right 
to remove and develop those substances "on" the surface? The plain language of the 1946 Bell 
Deed does not establish the intent to sever the surface from the subsurface. Without the 
severance of the two estates Bedrock's theory that mineral includes geothermal must fail. 
III. EVEN IF THE COURT DETERMINES THE 1946 BELL DEED SEVERED THE 
SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE, THE COURT SHOULD STILL FIND MINERAL 
DOES NOT INCLUDE GEOTHERMAL. 
A. Bedrock's Authority Defining Mineral To Include Geothermal Is Not Persuasive. 
In Idaho, a geothermal resource only has value and can only be exploited, if it qualifies 
under the Idaho Geothermal Resources Act. The act expressly states geothermal is not mineral. 
By this action, Bedrock attempts to do an end run around that definition by seeking adjudication 
inconsistent with the Act, but then can be presented to the department seeking the benefits of the 
very Act it is seeking to avoid. 
Bedrock points to foreign authority to argue geothermal should be included in a "mineral 
reservation. " 
Bedrock cites four cases that dealt specifically with the issue of geothermal and 
minerals. A careful review of the cases cited by Bedrock show all four cases were decided well 
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after the 1946 Bell Deed. More importantly the cases cited were decided after the legislature of 
the State ofIdaho defined geothermal to NOT be a mineral. I.C. § 42-4002(c). 
Such, a position is interesting because Bedrock argues so forcefully that the Geothermal 
Resource Act is not applicable to the 1946 Bell Deed because it was enacted after 1946. Yet, 
Bedrock relies on case law also decided after 1946. 
The cases cited by Bedrock are Geothermal Kinetics, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 75 
Cal. App. 3d 56, 141 Cal. Rptr. 879 (Ct. App. 1977), R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, 
Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1076 (Utah 1997), U.S. v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271, 1279 (9 th Cir. 
1977), and Rosette Inc. v. United States, 277 F.3d 1272 (loth Cir. 2002). 
Bedrock cites these cases while ignoring the fact that the State of Idaho had earlier 
concluded geothermal was not a mineral and was "sui generis." 
The Idaho Geothermal Resource Act was enacted in 1972, five years before the earliest 
holding cited by Bedrock. By enacting the Geothermal Resource Act the Legislature recognized 
the need to move quickly on the issue of defining geothermal. 
The Legislature further finds that there is presently substantial 
interest in geothermal resources of this state that regulation in the 
public interest is imperative, and that regulation must take effect at 
an early date. 
Idaho Session Laws, Ch. 301, (1972). If Bedrock is to have a valuable and exploitable interest in 
geothermal resource, it must have an interest which qualifies under the Act. 
Bedrock argues the Idaho Geothermal Resource Act is not determinative in defining 
geothermal,3 while relying on the definition of the courts of the Ninth Circuit, Utah and 
California. But, again, Bedrock's interest must qualify under the Act to have value. To qualify 
under the Act, Bedrock must satisfy the Act's definition. 
3 More fully explored below. 
7 
Bedrock itself admits it would be subject to the definition of the Geothermal Resource 
Act if it sought to develop geothermal resources on the property in question when it states: "[i]t 
is entirely consistent, however to conclude that as the owners of the rights to exploit geothermal 
resources underlying the property, the Bell heirs and their lessees must comply with the 
permitting and other regulatory requirements of the Geothermal Resource Act." 
Bedrock is agreeing to be bound by the Geothermal Resource Act for everything except 
the definition of "geothermal resource." In fact, they do not even acknowledge the statute as 
persuasive in defining geothermal resources. This action is intended to supercede the statutory 
definition by obtaining an adjudication diametrically opposed to that definition. 
Idatherm on the other hand believes the definition of geothermal resource as established 
by the Idaho legislature, (if not controlling) is at least more persuasive than foreign case law. 
Finally, Idatherm believes that if Bedrock seeks the rights and privileges of the Act, it must 
comply with and meet the statutory definition. 
B. Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State Is Relevant. 
Bedrock asserts Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673,978 P.2d 233, is 
not relevant in deciding if a mineral reservation severs the surface from the subsurface; arguing 
the case involves the interpretation of a statute and is not relevant. 
Yet, Bedrock cites as authority case law from foreign courts interpreting statutes to 
support its theory that a mineral reservation includes geothermal. 
Evidently, statutory interpretation involving mineral reservations by this Court is 
irrelevant and not instructive but if the case is from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits (See U.S. v. 
Union Oil Co. 549 F.2d 1271, 1279 (1977) and Rosette Inc. v. United States, 277 F.3d 1222 
(1oth cir. 2002) and involve the interpretation of federal statutes they should be considered. 
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Bedrock cites the above cases to support its position and then observes, "although these 
cases involve the interpretation of a federal statute rather than a deed [t]he reasoning of the 
courts in these cases is applicable here .... " Respondent Brief page 11 lines 1-3. 
Yet for some reason this court's interpretation of a statute in Treasure Valley is not 
applicable? The court in Treasure Valley was asked to determine if a mineral reservation under a 
state statue included sand, gravel and pumice. The state in Treasure Valley, arguing as 
Appellant, contended (like Bedrock) that a reservation of "all.. .minerals of whatsoever kind or 
character requires the Court to define minerals broadly," and should therefore include pumice, 
sand and gravel. Treasure Valley Concrete v. State 132 Idaho 673, 676, 978 P.2d 233, 236 
(1998). 
The Treasure Valley Court decided the case by statutory construction finding "where an 
amendment is made it carries with it the presumption that the legislature intended the statute thus 
amended to have a meaning different than theretofore accorded it." Id. 
The Treasure Valley Court, could have cited earlier case law and found as Bedrock 
argues, that a mineral reservation should be interpreted broadly. It did not. 4 Such is instructive 
for the case at hand and therefore relevant. 
IV. TO REJECT THE DEFINITION OF I.C. § 42-4002 IS TO REJECT THE PLAIN 
MEANING OF THE STATUTE, CREATE CONFUSION AND IGNORE THE 
LEGISLATURE'S INTENT 
Bedrock's main argument against the definition of "geothermal" as established by I.C. 
4 See Harris v. State ofldaho, 147 Idaho 401, 406, 210 PJd 86, 91 (2009) wherein the Court stated, "the 
interpretation of pre-1986 I.e. § 47-701 and whether sand, gravel and pumice are included in that sections list of 
minerals presents a question of first impression before the Court and that other states have interpreted minerals in 
similar statutes to include sand, gravel and pumice. Therefore, until our decision in Treasure Valley Concrete, some 
question remained as to whether sand and gravel was a mineral under I.e. § 47-701, and the creation of the Mineral 
Lease between the State and Harris' simply represented opposing parties of conflicting interests entering into an 
agreement. 
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§ 42-4002(c) is based on what Bedrock calls the Act's "limiting language." Because I.C. § 42-
4002 states "[ w ]henever used in this act..." Bedrock believes the definition of geothermal 
resources is limited and the policy is not relevant, but Bedrock acknowledges its interest has 
value only if recognized by the Act, because it would be bound to follow the Act if it wanted to 
develop or utilize a geothermal resource. 
The problem with Bedrock's reasoning is four- fold. I-Bedrock ignores the very rule of 
construction it is asking this Court to follow. 2-It ignores the fact such an interpretation would 
create legal confusion. 3- The legislature has shown through adoption of other statutes its 
intention that the Geothermal Resource Act define "geothermal resources" outside the 
Geothermal Resource Act. 4- Bedrock's interest only has value if recognized by the Act. 
A. Statutory Construction 
Bedrock argues the language "whenever used in this act. ... " prevents the Court from 
using the statutory definition and from reviewing the legislative history and policy behind the 
Act. In fact, neither Bedrock nor the District Court considered it persuasive. 
Such a contention completely ignores the declaration of the statute itself. As Bedrock 
points out in its brief, "Statutes must be read to give effect to every word, clause and sentence." 
Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 690 (1984). 
To ignore then the policy behind the statute is to ignore the mandate of the statute itself 
and I.C. § 42-4014 mandates the following: 
"Liberal Construction.-This act shall be construed liberally to serve its purposes and 
policy." 
I.C. § 42-4014. 
Thus, by mandate the policy of the Geothermal Resource Act must be reviewed and 
construed liberally. The same policy Bedrock declares is "irrelevant" the legislature says "shall" 
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be reviewed and must be "construed liberally." What then is the policy and purpose of the Act? 
From the Session laws (quoted at length for convenience) we can read the full enactment of the 
Geothermal Resource Act its purpose and its policy: 
AN ACT 
TO REGULATE THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF GEOTHERMAL RESOURCES; 
MAKING LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND STATING LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE AND 
POLICY; PROVIDING A SHORT TITLE; DEFINING TERMS; REQUIRING PERMITS FOR 
GEOTHERMAL RESOURCE WELLS, PRESCRIBING APPLICATION INFORMATION 
THEREFORE, AND A FILING FEE; GOVERNING AGENCY PROCEDURE IN RECEIVING 
AND REVIEWING PERMIT APPLICATIONS; ALLOWING AGENCY PROCEDURE FOR 
CONSOLIDATED PERMIT APPLICATION AND PERMIT EXEMPTIONS; STATING 
CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO PERMIT APPLICATION APPROVAL OR 
DISAPPROVAL; PROVIDING A RIGHT TO A HEARING; ALLOWING PERMIT 
ISSUANCE AND REFUSALS AND A JUDICIAL APPEAL; PROVIDING FOR WATER 
RIGHTS APPLICATIONS WHERE NECESSARY; EXEMPTING CERTAIN EXISTING 
USES AND PROVIDING THAT CERTAIN FUTURE USES BE REGULATED UNDER 
WATER LAWS; REGULATING WELL ABANDONMENT; PROVIDING FOR GENERAL 
REGULATIONS; PROVIDING FOR WELL LOGS AND OTHER RECORDS AND 
REPORTS; GIVING THE DIRECTOR AUTHORITY TO SEEK JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT; 
MAKING WILLFUL VIOLATION A MISDEMEANOR; PROVIDING FOR PERMIT 
AMENDMENTS; PROVIDING A RIGHT TO A HEARING ON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF AGENCY ORDERS; SAVING FROM PREEMPTION OTHER LAWS OF THE STATE 
AND RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS; PROVIDING FOR VOLUNTARY AND COMPULSORY 
UNIT OPERATION OF GEOTHERMAL AREAS; STATING GENERAL RULES OF 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PROVIDING SEVERABILITY; AND DECLARING AN 
EMERGENCY. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State ofIdaho: 
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared that the State of Idaho claims the right to regulate the 
development and use of all of the geothermal resources within this state and that geothermal 
resources are natural resources of limited quantity and of a unique value to all of the people of 
the state. 
The legislature of the State of Idaho further declares that the geothermal resources of 
this state may provide an outstanding opportunity for enhancement of our economy and quality 
of life with a minimum of environmental degradation through a utilization of this energy source. 
It is also recognized that the process of utilization and development of our geothermal resources 
on a large scale may be associated with risks to the maximum sustained yield from these 
resources, risks to our valuable ground-water resources, and risks to the environment in the 
immediate locality of and around the installations at which such utilization is done. 
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The legislature further finds that there is presently substantial interest in the geothermal 
resources of this state that regulation in the public interest is imperative, and that regulation 
must take effect at any early date. 
The legislature does therefore declare that it is the policy and purpose of this state to 
maximize the benefits to the entire state which may be derived from the utilization of our 
geothermal resources, while minimizing the detriments and costs of all kinds which could result 
from their utilization. This policy and purpose is embodied in this act which provides for the 
immediate regulation of geothermal resource exploration and development in the public interest. 
Idaho Session Laws, Ch., 301 (1972) (Emphasis added). 
"Liberally construing the policy," it is clear the legislature felt an emergency existed in 
1972, such that it was necessary to regulate the development and use of "all" of the geothermal 
resources within this state. There is no exception for private resources in this declaration. 
Further, the policy goes on to declare, "it is the policy and purpose of this state to 
maximize the benefits from the utilization of our geothermal resources .... " Id. 
Clearly then the policy of the act is to maximize the utilization of geothermal resources 
within the state. In order to do so geothermal resources must be defined. I.C. § 42-4002(c) does 
so and states unequivocally geothermal resources are not "mineral." 
B. The Statutory Definition Does Not Retroactively Change A Pre-Existing Right 
Bedrock argues the Act itself does not affect private conveyances. It argues to do so 
would retroactively affect a pre-existing contractual right. Such a position is contrary to the 
liberal construction required by the Act but also contains a logical fallacy. First, defining 
geothermal resource to not be "mineral" does not affect the contractual rights of the parties to the 
1946 Bell Deed. The parties have what they have. What the court is being asked to do is 
interpret the intent of the 1946 Bell Deed language. 
The question is one of law not fact. Bedrock, claims this Court should look to and follow 
the interpretation of the Ninth Circuit and other foreign jurisdictions to define mineral. Idatherm, 
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believes the court should follow the policy and statutory definition established under the 
Geothermal Resource Act to define mineral. 
Applying the definition proposed by Bedrock based on case law as compared to the 
statutory definition of geothermal based on I.C. § 42-4002(c) is not a retroactive application of a 
"preexisting" contract right. They are legal interpretations. One is based on foreign case law. 
The other, the Idaho legislature. Thus, the argument that the application of the statutory 
definition would retroactively affect a pre-existing contract right and is unconstitutional is 
wrong. 
C. Bedrock's Rejection ofI.C. 42-4002 Would Create Legal Confusion 
Bedrocks rejection of the definition of geothermal resources under the I.C. 42-4002 
would create legal confusion in the implementation of the Geothermal Resource Act. 
Bedrock puts a bubble over the statute (despite the policy to the contrary) by arguing it is 
not to be used in defining geothermal. If, the Court agrees and defines a mineral reservation to 
include geothermal, how is such an interpretation to be viewed by the Department of Water 
Resources when a permit is requested? If, the Department has conflicting applications, one based 
on a mineral reservation and the other based on the statute, which interpretation would the 
Director of the Department follow? The Department would be required by the Act to define 
geothermal as not a mineral. But what of a contrary adjudication? 
If a permit were issued based on a mineral reservation could a private landowner whose 
surface right was being infringed sue asking for relief because the permit was issued based on a 
mineral reservation? Bedrock's posture would essentially create two separate definitions in the 
state of Idaho, something I.e. § 42-4002 avoids by defining geothermal. 
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Bedrock, tries to mInImIZe this conflict by posturing that it must comply with the 
permitting and other regulatory requirements of the Geothermal Resource Act. Again, as 
mentioned earlier, how can you comply with the permitting requirements when you don't meet 
the statutory definitions? 
In other words, Bedrock wants to have its cake and to eat too. It wants to reject the Act's 
definition of mineral as not being geothermal in resolving the 1946 Bell Deed mineral 
reservation, but wants to exercise the rights and privileges of the Act providing the definition? 
When Bedrock applies for a permit to develop its mineral reservation, does the resource it seeks 
to develop suddenly become subject to the Geothermal Resource Act, where before it wasn't? 
Of course not, the definition is set by statute and must be followed. 
This is the very reason, Idatherm cited to the "unitizing" portion of the Geothermal 
Resource Act. See, I.C. § 42-4013. It was not because Idatherm's "lack of understanding of the 
subject" as suggested by Bedrock, but because in order to have forced integration a uniform 
definition applicable to all landowners would be required. 
Could a landowner object to the integration or creation of a cooperative unit by claiming 
his neighbor's mineral rights are not geothermal, and thus he cannot be subject to unitization? 
Such a position creates legal confusion. The legislature resolves the difficulty by 
declaring geothermal is neither mineral nor water, it is "sui generis." 
D. I.C. § 42-226 and § 42-230 Establish the Broad Scope of the Geothermal 
Resource Act 
I.C. § 42-4002 (c) defines Geothermal resource as: 
[T]the natural heat energy of the earth, the energy in whatever 
form, which may be found in any position and at any depth below 
the surface of the earth ... " and the energy that can be extracted 
from "such natural heat and all minerals in solution or other 
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Id. 
products obtained from the material medium of any geothermal 
source. (emphasis added). 
It other words, a geothermal resource is the heat energy that comes from the earth or the 
heat energy that can be extracted from a mineral solution or other medium. It is the medium 
which allows the heat energy to be extracted. 
The legislature then specifically defines, states and declares that: 
Ground water having a temperature of two hundred twelve (212) 
degrees Fahrenheit or more in the bottom of a well shall be 
classified as a geothermal resource. 
I.e. 42-4002 (c). 
Thus, the legislature recognized that ground water, when it reaches a certain temperature 
(212 degrees) Fahrenheit becomes sufficient to allow the heat energy to be extracted from the 
medium (the groundwater). 
The legislature "found" geothermal to be "closely related to and possibly affecting and 
affected by water and mineral resources in many instances." However, it was careful to have 
also "found" and "hereby declared to be sui generis, being neither a mineral resource nor a water 
resource .... " Id. 
Bedrock states that "[p]erplexingly, after asserting in its Complaint and arguing at length 
earlier in its briefing that geothermal resources are sui generis in all respects as a result of the 
definition contained in I.C. § 42 4002 .. .Idatherm then inconsistently asserts that I.e. § 42-230 
and § 42-226 applied together mean that all geothermal resources are ground water." 
What Idatherm was trying to show was that by enacting I.e. § 42-226 and § 42-230 the 
legislature realized the Geothermal Resource Act was to be used to define all ground water over 
"212 degrees" Fahrenheit as a geothermal resource. 
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I.C. § 42-226 declares all thermal and groundwater to be property of the State. However, 
for geothermal purposes, I.C. § 42-230 yields to the Geothermal Resource Act to define when the 
"ground water" will become a geothermal resource and "shall be administered as a geothermal 
resource." Id. The Geothermal Resource Act recognized that a geothermal resource is closely 
related to and possibly affecting and affected by water and mineral resources be defined as "sui 
generis." 
If, then as Bedrock argues, the definition of geothermal resources is confined solely to the 
Geothermal Resource Act why then does the legislature include the definition of Geothermal 
Resource to define all ground over 212 degrees Fahrenheit a geothermal resource? Clearly, the 
definition of geothermal resource is not confined to the "Act" as it covers and includes all 
groundwater within the state. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is Bedrock that is actually asking the court to move away from the 
intention expressed in the 1946 Bell Deed and define mineral as severing the surface from the 
subsurface so as to exploit "every valuable substance." 
Such an interpretation is vastly broader than the plain language of the 1946 Bell Deed, 
does not align with the conveyance language, creates legal confusion, and is not supported by 
case law, public policy, the Geothermal Resource Act, nor the broad inclusion of ground water as 
defined by Idaho Code. 
DATED this 261"- day of March, 2012. 
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16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Jc;~ day of March, 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be served upon the following person(s) 
in the following manner: 
Michael Christian 
737 North t h Street 
Boise ID 83702 
'i. United States Mail 
_ Fax (208) 342-2170 
_ Hand Delivery 
Other 
PARSONS, SMITH, STONE, LOVELAND 
& SHIRLEY, LLP 
Lance 
17 
